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Abstract
This study explores the impact  of competition from  costs of discrimination.  Wage discrimination  is  proxied
international  trade on wage  discrimination  by sex in two  by the portion of the wage gap  that cannot be explained
highly open economies.  If discrimination is costly,  as  by observable  skill differences  between men and women.
posited in neoclassical  theory based on Becker (1959),  The empirical  model is estimated using a rich panel data
then increased industry competitiveness  from  set of residual  wage gaps, trade ratios, and alternative
international  trade reduces  the incentive for employers to  measures of domestic concentration  for Taiwan (China)
discriminate  against women. Alternatively,  increased  and the Republic of Korea during the 1980s and 1990s.
international  trade  may contribute  to employment  Results  indicate that in contrast to  the implications  of
segregation and reduced bargaining  power for women to  neoclassical  theory, competition from foreign trade
achieve  wage gains. The approach centers on  comparing  in concentrated  industries is positively associated with
the impact of international  trade on wage  discrimination  wage discrimination.  These results imply that concerted
in concentrated  and nonconcentrated  sectors. The effect  efforts to enforce equal pay legislation and apply
of international  trade competition  is  expected  to be more  effective  equal opportunity  legislation are  crucial for
pronounced  in concentrated  sectors, where employers  ensuring that women's pay gains will match those of men
can use excess profits in the absence of trade to cover the  in a competitive environment.
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World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Max Ponglumjeak, room MC4-426, telephone
202-473-1060,  fax 202-522-3237,  email address mponglumjeak@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research Working Papers  are
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  Yana Rodgers may be contacted at yvrodg@wm.edu.  August 2003.
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Growth  in  international  trade  can  entail  beneficial  effects  for  workers  in  developing
countries.  Based  on  neoclassical  trade  theory,  trade  expansion  is  expected  to  increase  the
demand for relatively abundant,  lower-skilled labor and reduce wage disparities  among groups of
workers.  A  growing  number of empirical  studies  have  used partial-equilibrium  approaches  to
estimate the impact  of intemational  trade-as  measured by import penetration,  exchange  rates,
protection  rates,  trade  reform,  and  export  orientation-on  wage  dispersion  in  developing
countries.'  Changes  in  overall  wage  inequality  vary  across  countries  and  regions,  partly
reflecting  the  complexity  of changes  in  the  overall  macroeconomic  environment  and  in  the
underlying  labor  market  dynamics.  Moreover,  the  use of firm-level  or industry-level  data  in
most of this research provides limited information on worker productivity characteristics,  making
it more difficult to disentangle reported trade impacts  from other exogenous  changes  in worker
characteristics and their associated market returns.2
Because women  tend to cluster  in lower-skill  jobs and men  cluster  in higher-skill jobs,
neoclassical  theory  similarly  predicts  trade-induced  changes  in  skill  demand  to  reduce  pay
differentials  between men  and women.  Yet international  trade  can affect women's relative pay
through  another  channel whereby  trade acts  as an instrument  of industry  competitiveness.  In
particular,  rising competition associated with international  trade can generate increased pressure
on firms to  engage in cost-cutting practices.  Reinterpreting  Becker's  (1959)  theory in an open
economy  context,  one  would expect that  costly discrimination could  not persist  in the face  of
long-run competition.  Hence rising competition from international trade is expected to eliminate
any discriminatory pay differentials between men and women in the long run.In contrast,  according to the non-neoclassical  approach,  discrimination  can actually be a
tool of competition  among firms  and industries.  Far from becoming  an equalizing  force,  trade
may well perpetuate  or exacerbate wage disparities.  In this approach,  wages  are determined by
not only worker  skills but also  industry characteristics,  which  shape  the  respective  bargaining
power of groups of workers.  In the context of a hierarchy of jobs and the specter of joblessness,
both characteristics  of a typical capitalist economy, certain groups of workers are better placed to
bargain for and maintain favorable employment conditions.  Firms may also find it advantageous
to maintain a lower wage workforce with a weaker bargaining power while paying higher wages
to groups  of workers  with better  options.  In  such  a context,  trade  competition  may  cause  the
decline of certain groups of industries  and rise of others,  leaving workers  in declining industries
at a disadvantage  in bargaining for higher wages  in new jobs. The dislocations  caused by trade
competition could well widen the wage disparities among groups of workers.
Adopting the neoclassical framework,  a number of empirical  studies have examined how
discrimination  changes  in response  to  the  competitive  environment.  Much  of this  work  has
focused on domestic industry structure using data for the United States.  For example,  Black and
Strahan  (2001)  find  that  by  reducing  rents  that  previously  accrued  to  men,  banking-sector
deregulation  leads to improvements  in women's relative wages beyond what can be explained by
improvements  in  women's  skill  characteristics.  In  contrast,  Hellerstein,  Neumark  and  Troske
(1997)  argue  that  market  forces  over  time  have  little  impact  on  reducing  discrimination.
Although plants  with higher levels  of market power  show  evidence  of wage discrimination  by
sex compared  to plants with less  market power,  the plants  with more market power  experience
no  growth penalty  over  time.  Racial  discrimination  has also been  examined  in  the context  of
industries  that have  greater  or lesser  levels  of concentration,  with mixed  results.  For example,
2deregulation  in the trucking industry has led to lower real wages for white workers,  resulting in
reduced  wage  disparities  between  whites and blacks  (Peoples  and  Saunders  1993,  Peoples  and
Talley 2001). However, findings in Agesa et. al (2001)  actually contradict  the idea that firms in
concentrated industries can afford to engage in earnings discrimination against minority workers.
On the employment  side,  Coleman (2002)  also  finds  little evidence  to support the neoclassical
framework,  as minority employment is positively related to market concentration in urban areas.
Most  of this  work  conceptualizes  competition  on an  industry-by-industry  basis.  An
alternative  set of studies  has expressed  competition  as  an economy-wide  tendency  for rates  of
profit to equalize  across industries under conditions  of capital  mobility.3 Because  concentration
may facilitate  capital  mobility and  the tendency  for uniform profits  to emerge,  this alternative
approach  allows  for  the  idea  that  competition  encompasses  monopoly  and  industrial
concentration.  Rather than see competition necessarily driving out discrimination,  discrimination
can  actually remain  as a viable by-product of competition among firms and groups of workers,
each  behaving in  economically rational  ways.  This alternative  view of competition,  although
difficult to operationalize  and use in empirical research, may help to reconcile the observance  of
persistent discrimination  in the face of growing competition.
The present study contributes new evidence on the link between industry competitiveness
and  wage  discrimination,  with  international  trade  acting  as  the  agent  for  increased
competitiveness.  Just  a small  number  of existing  studies  have  explicitly  tested  the  impact  of
international  trade  on  wage  discrimination.  Black  and  Brainerd  (2002)  find  that  U.S.
manufacturing  industries  that  are  relatively  less  competitive  domestically  but  exposed  to
increasing  competition  from imported  goods  show  evidence  of reduced  wage  discrimination
against women.4 However,  the application  to data  from a fairly  closed economy  weakens  the
3generality  of  these  results.  Artecona  and  Cunningham  (2001)  find  similar  but  statistically
insignificant  results  for Mexico.  Our  study uses  a similar approach  in isolating  the impact of
intemational  trade  competition  on discrimination  by estimating  the effect  of international trade
openness  on  the  residual  wage  gap  in  concentrated  industries.  The  residual  wage  gap-the
portion  of the wage gap that cannot be explained by observed skill differences between  men and
women-is  commonly  attributed  to wage  discrimination.  Our use  of a rich panel  data  set by
industry and year  for  Taiwan  (China) and  South Korea,  two highly open economies,  improves
the generality and potential robustness of the results in this line of research.
II.  Stylized  Facts for Taiwan (China) and Korea
With  their status  as major  international  trade  partners  and their notably  high degree  of
outward  orientation,  Taiwan  (China)  and  Korea  are  excellent  candidates  for  contributing  new
evidence  on how  industrial  competitiveness  through  international  trade  affects  employers'  pay
practices.  Taiwan  (China)'s total manufactured  trade to output ratio has risen  continuously from
a low of 48% in the early 1980s to a high of almost 90% by the late  1990s.  Korea's international
openness in manufactured  goods, while high by most standards, has declined during much of this
period,  from a high of 56%  in  1985 to a low of 45% in  1993.  In both economies,  these trends in
international  trade have been accompanied  by structural changes  in manufacturing.  Industry and
export mixes  have  shifted  toward  higher-skill  products,  while  lower-skill  industries  have  been
moving  abroad.  Both  economies  are  known  for  their  governments'  active  roles  in  guiding
development  and  the  extensive  use  of  subsidized  credit,  tax  privileges,  and  protectionism,
particularly  for  firms  that  produced  export  goods.  Between  the  two,  Taiwan  (China)  has
experienced  a  more  competitive  industrial  structure  characterized  by  numerous  small  and
4medium-sized  firms, while  Korea's industrial  structure has been dominated  by the activities  of
very large firms.5
Figure  1 provides  more  information  on  movements  in  export  and  import  ratios  by
industries  according  to  a broad  grouping by  firm concentration  within  manufacturing  sectors.
For Taiwan (China), consistent with the aggregate  trend in overall trade, import and export ratios
rose  over time  for both  concentrated  and less  concentrated  industries.  One  factor that helps to
explain  the increases in import shares  is Taiwan (China)'s  foreign direct investment  in East and
Southeast Asia, particularly mainland  China.  As labor-intensive industries  left Taiwan  (China),
these  products  then  became  imports  into  Taiwan  (China),  accounting  for  an  increase  in their
import  share.  At  the  same  time,  the  export-oriented  industries  switched  toward  higher-skill
products  that were  not competing  with  the  imports. Within  the broad concentration  groupings,
the median manufacturing  sector had import ratios  that averaged 20%  for the period  and export
ratios  that  averaged  40%.  In  contrast,  Korea's  export  ratio  in  non-concentrated  industries
dropped  considerably  during  the  1980s  and  much  of the  1990s,  while  the  export  ratio  in
concentrated  industries  exhibited  more  fluctuation.6 Korean  import  ratios  across  most
manufacturing  sectors  stagnated.  Overall,  Korean  trade  ratios are  lower than those of Taiwan
(China).
Two decades of structural change in both economies also saw major changes  in the labor
market.  In both  economies,  labor  force  participation  rates for men have  fallen  and for women
have risen.  In Taiwan (China) between  1980 and 1999, the labor force participation  rate for men
dropped  from  77%  to 70%,  while  for women  it rose  from  39%  to 46%.  Changes  for Korea
during the 1980s and 1990s are similar albeit not quite as dramatic.  At the same time, women's
average  skills and  educational  attainment  relative to that of men have  risen  considerably.  For
5example,  in Korea, just 23% of women  and 54%  of men  attained high  school or above in  1980;
these shares had risen to 77%  for women and 87% for men by  1998.7  Despite women's relative
gains  in  labor-market  qualifications,  Taiwan  (China)'s  average  female-male  wage  ratio  in
manufacturing  dropped  from  66%  in  1981  to 60%  in  1993,  with  a  reversal  to  67%  by  1999.
Recent figures for Taiwan (China) compare favorably with other East Asian economies  but stand
below  those of most  industrialized  countries  along  the  Pacific  Rim,  including  Australia,  New
Zealand,  and the United States.  Unlike Taiwan (China),  Korea's  female  to male wage ratio  rose
fairly steadily  throughout the period, from 47% in  1980 to 58%  by 1998.  Despite  this progress,
Korea still shares with Japan  the distinction of having one of the world's lowest  female to male
wage ratios.
Some  of the  observed  wage  differentials  may  be  explained  by  wage  discrimination
against  female  workers.  Because  it  is  difficult  to  measure,  wage  discrimination  by  sex  is
commonly proxied  by the  residual  wage  gap-the  portion  of the wage  gap  which -cannot  be
explained  by observed productivity  differences  between men and women.8 Figure 2 shows  how
the residual  wage  gap in manufacturing  has  changed  over time  in  both  economies.  Trends  in
wage  gaps are  separated by concentrated  and less  concentrated  industries.  For Taiwan  (China),
the residual  wage  gap  is lower  in concentrated  industries  than  in  non-concentrated  industries.
This  observation  actually  counters  the  static  implications  of Becker's  theory.  However,  our
primary  interest  is whether international  trade generates  pressures  to reduce  discriminatory  pay
differentials  in concentrated  industries.  In both concentrated and less concentrated industries, the
residual  wage  gap rises  sharply  until  the mid-1990s  and diminishes  somewhat  during  the  late
1  990s. When  superimposed on trends in the trade ratios, the period of rising residual wage gaps
coincides  with  a fairly steady  increase  in both export  and import ratios, while  the narrowing  in
6the residual  wage  gap  toward  the  end of the period  coincides  with a  flattening  in  trade ratios.
These  patterns  suggest  that  greater  openness  to  foreign  trade  is  associated  with  a  larger
differential  between  male  and  female  wages,  even  after  controlling  for  skill  characteristics.
Further analysis shows that real wage  levels for both men and women are higher in concentrated
industries  than  non-concentrated  industries-though  men  in  non-concentrated  industries  earn
substantially  more  than  women  in concentrated  industries.  The most  likely  explanation  is the
ability of firms in concentrated industries to pay higher wages to all workers.
For  Korea,  the  residual  wage  gap  in  concentrated  industries  is  above  that  in  non-
concentrated  industries  in the  1980s and below after  1992, reflecting the near continuous  drop in
the residual  wage  gap  in  concentrated  industries  that  accompanied  a  relatively  flat  wage  gap
trend in non-concentrated  industries.  When superimposed on the trade series, the decline in the
residual  wage  gap  among  concentrated  industries  coincides  with  trade  ratios  that  are  either
stagnating  or declining  somewhat.  Similar  to  Taiwan  (China),  men  and women  in  Korea's
concentrated  industries  earn  higher  wage  levels  than  their  counterparts  in  non-concentrated
industries.
A  brief look  at  employment  changes  provides  more  insight  on  how  well  the  Taiwan
(China)  and  Korean  cases  support  Becker's  (1959)  theory,  since  Becker  predicts  that stronger
competition  will reduce the wage  gap in concentrated  industries via  an expansion  in demand for
female  labor.  That  is, in principle,  competitive  cost  cutting  translates  into  the  substitution  of
cheaper  female  labor  for  more  expensive  male  labor.  The  expansion  in  relative  demand  for
female  labor should  then bid up the female wage.  For Taiwan (China),  evidence  indicates  that
over  time,  the  residual  wage  gap  widens  with  import  competition  via  a  relative  loss  of
employment  for  women,  particularly  in  concentrated  sectors.  Import  growth  appears  to  be
7reducing  the demand  for female labor as women's share of industry  employment declines.  This
employment  loss  could  be  translating  into  less  bargaining  power  for  female  workers.  For
example,  in  1981  female workers tended to cluster in textiles  and garments, the largest employer
in  manufacturing,  while  male  workers  tended to  cluster  in  basic  and  fabricated  metals.  Three
quarters  of the  textiles  and  garments  workforce  was  female  in  1981.  That  said,  substantial
movement occurred  over time across  industries  for both female  and male workers,  with a large
shift out of textiles and apparel  into the. electrical equipment and electronics  industry. By  1999,
electrical  equipment  and  electronics  had  become  the  leading  employer of women,  employing
34% of women,  while  basic and fabricated metals continued to be the largest  employer of men,
employing  22% of men.  This  shift, however,  has not entailed  a dramatic  increase  in women's
representation  among all workers  in the electrical  and electronics industry.  In fact, Figures 3 and
4  show  that  the  percent  female  in  industry  employment  in  textiles  and  apparel  and  in  the
electrical  equipment  and  electronics  industries  has  declined  over  this  period  alongside  a
widening of the residual wage gap and growing import shares in both sectors.
Industry-level  descriptive  statistics  for  Korea  generate  similar  conclusions  for
employment  patterns.  With  49% of the female  workforce,  textiles  and  apparel  employed  the
most female workers  in  1980, while  electrical  equipment,  electronics,  and transport  equipment
employed  high  shares of male  workers.  Among  all sectors,  textiles  and  apparel  recorded  the
highest representation of female workers among total workers.  Similar to Taiwan (China), over
time both women's and men's employment  shifted out of textiles  and apparel  and into electrical
equipment  and  electronics.  By  1998  electrical  equipment  and  electronics  had  become  the
leading  employer  of both  women  and  men,  accounting  for  27%  of female  and  18%  of male
employment. Also similar to Taiwan (China), all three industries recorded lower female shares of
8employment  over  time  (Figure  3).9  Yet  in  the  electrical  equipment  and  electronics  industry,
Korea's wage gap actually narrowed in the  face of relatively constant export  and import shares
over time, whereas the Korean textiles and apparel sectors experienced no consistent relationship
between  trade  shares and wage gaps (Figure 4).  In closing,  the largest  employers  in neither the
Taiwan (China) nor Korean manufacturing  sectors experienced  trends that are consistent with the
dynamic implications  of Becker's theory.
III.  Empirical Model
The  empirical  model  tests  the  degree  to  which  increased  industry  competitiveness
through  international  trade  affects  wage  discrimination  by  sex.  Under  the  null  hypothesis,
increased  industry  competitiveness  from  international  trade  places  pressure  on  firms to reduce
costly discrimination against women.  The key challenge  in testing this hypothesis is to isolate
the impact of increased trade competition  from other contemporaneous  events that are unrelated
to  participation  in  international  markets.  To  do  so,  the  analysis  controls  for  differences  in
domestic  market  structure across  industries.  In particular,  firms in industries  that are relatively
concentrated  arguably  face  less  domestic  competition  and  hence  less  pressure  to reduce  costs,
while firms in relatively non-concentrated  industries arguably  face greater domestic pressure to
cut costs.  Hence any observed reduction in discrimination  against female workers in relatively
concentrated  industries  should  be  attributed  to the  competitive  forces  from  international  trade
rather  than  to  domestic  pressures.  The  empirical  approach  thus  identifies  the  impact  of
international  competition  on  wage  discrimination  by comparing  the  residual  wage  impact  of
trade openness in more concentrated industries to the impact in less concentrated industries.
Let  Wim,  - Wj,f  the dependent variable,  denote the difference between  men and women in
average log residual wages in industry  i and year t. The estimation equation is expressed as:
9WimitW,jfr  =  1BO  + 1 A1C1 +/J2Ml, +  A3Ci MI, +  (1)
where  Ci  is  a measure  of domestic  concentration  by industry,  and Mi, is the  import  ratio  (and
alternatively the export ratio) by industry and year.  The final variable-the interaction  between
industry  concentration  and  the  import ratio-is the  key  variable  of interest  in  examining  the
dynamic  implications  of Becker's  theory.  Its coefficient  represents  the impact  of international
trade  competition  on  the  average  residual  wage  gap  in  concentrated  industries.  The  Data
Appendix  discusses all data used to estimate the model.
The dependent  variable  is  constructed  from  panel  data  on average  residual  wages  by
industry  and year.1'-  To  construct the residual gap,  a fairly standard  wage equation  is estimated
for  male  workers  in  each  year.  The  observable  characteristics  include  education,  experience,
regional  location,  and  worker  status."  These  regressions  exclude  occupation  variables  since
labor market discrimination  may play a role  in occupational  attainment.  Predicted  log wages  for
male and female workers  are then calculated using coefficients from the male wage regression.'2
The difference between actual  log wages and predicted log wages yields residual wages,  and the
difference between male and female residual wages yields the residual gender wage gap.
The  independent  variable  Ci  is  measured  with  alternative  concentration  indices
commonly  found  in  the  industrial-organization  literature.  Robustness  tests  are  then  conducted
using  these  different  measures.  First,  C,  is  constructed  from  Pareto-function  estimates  of
concentration across size categories and industries (Curry and George  1983).  13  In each industry,
the number of firms of size s or bigger can be expressed as a Pareto distribution of the form:
P(s) = (so Is)  forsgreaterthanaminimumsizeso,  (2)
where  a is a constant.  Taking the logarithm of both sides gives the estimation equation:
log P(s) =a  logsO  - alogs.  (3)
10Hence  the frequency  distribution of firms across  increasing size groups is specified on a log-log
scale as a line with slope -a.  The steeper the slope coefficient,  the less concentrated  the industry.
The  Pareto-function  estimates  are  used  to  construct  both  binary  and  continuous  variables  for
domestic concentration.  For the binary specification,  industries are ranked in ascending order  of
concentration.  Industries  below a critical breakpoint are assigned a value of one for concentrated,
while industries above a critical breakpoint are assigned a value of zero for non-concentrated.
Table  1 presents  concentration  rankings based on the Pareto-function  estimates in which
size categories  are proxied by operating receipts  for Taiwan (China) in  1981  and by shipments
for Korea  in  1983.  These rankings  are  quite robust,  as  indicated by a series of tests based on
Spearman coefficients of rank correlation using a later year of data and using assets to measure
size  categories.  For Taiwan  (China),  certain  industries  are  consistently  less concentrated  than
others  both in  1981  and  in  1996,  no matter  which  measure  is  used.  These  industries  include
basic  metals,  wood products  and furniture,  and machinery.  The correlation  coefficient  between
the  1981  and  1996 estimates is 0.78 using operating receipts and 0.75 using assets.  Hence fixing
an  industry's  concentration  status  at  the  beginning  of the  period  is  a reasonable  indicator  of
concentration  since  the  rankings  do  not  change  much  over  time.14 Furthermore,  the  Pareto-
function  rankings  are  robust  to  classifying  concentration  by  the  number  of industry-specific
enterprises  divided  by  industry  output.  For  example,  the  correlation  coefficient  between  the
asset-based  ranking  and  the number  of enterprises/output  ranking  is  0.71  in  1981  and 0.92  in
1996.  As  with  the  Pareto-function  estimates,  rankings  according  to  the  number  of
enterprises/output have not changed  much over time, as demonstrated  by a Spearman coefficient
of 0.83 between  1981  and 1996.Alternatively, the K-firm concentration ratio expresses the cumulative market share of the
Kth  firm  in  an  industry  (Curry  and  George  1983).  The  greater this  market  share,  the  more
concentrated  the  industry.  This  method  is  applied  to  Taiwan  (China)  data  on  gross  value  of
production by 4-digit SIC codes from the  1986 Industrial  and  Commercial Census (Chou,  1988).
Averaging  the  concentration  ratios  within  2-digit  level industries  and  sorting by market  share
produces  a ranking that corresponds closely with that of the Pareto-function  estimates.  Two other
techniques  for  measuring  concentration  include  the  Herfmdahl  index  and  the  profit  rate  by
industry.  The Herfindahl  index is expressed  as the summation  of the  squared market shares  of
each firm  in  an industry.  The profit rate  is  expressed  as  annual profits  divided by annual  total
sales, with the assumption  that the higher the concentration,  the higher  the profit.  For Taiwan
(China),  these techniques produce  rankings that correspond  less  closely with those produced by
the Pareto-function  estimates.  The Herfmdahl  index may be a noisy measure  of concentration
for Taiwan (China),  which is characterized by thousands of small firms each  with a tiny share of
the  market.  The  profit  rate  measure  suffers  from  cyclical  effects:  if applied  to data  from  a
recession  year,  such  as  1981  in  Taiwan  (China),  a  disproportionate  reduction  in  profits  may
distort the profit ranking.
For Korea,  the  rankings  are  fairly comparable  across  measures,  but they. are  less robust
than those  in Taiwan  (China).'5 Again  certain industries  are  consistently  less  concentrated than
others,  no  matter  which  measure  is  used.  These  industries  include  miscellaneous  products,
printing  and publishing,  and fabricated  metal  products.  The  Spearman  coefficients  between  the
1983  and  1998  estimates  using  assets to proxy  for  size is  0.83,  which provides  some  evidence
that industry  rankings remain consistent  over the period.'6 The  shipments-based  measure  is less
closely  correlated with  the assets  measure,  with  a Spearman  coefficient  of 0.67 using  the  1983
12data.  However,  assets  may be a poor basis  for concentration  estimates  when firms have  small
assets but very large debts, as is likely to be true in Korea.  The ranking for Korea in Table 1 is
fairly robust to a ranking based on the number of establishments divided by output per industry.
This  latter  ranking  has  also  not  changed  much  over  time,  as  demonstrated  by  a  Spearman
coefficient of 0.93 between  1981  and 1996.
In equation  (1), the independent variable Mi, is measured using panel data  on the ratio of
imports to domestic  production  (and alternatively,  the ratio of exports  to domestic  production).
Trade  shares  are  specified  as  natural  logs,  so  their  coefficients  are  interpreted  as  elasticities.
Trade  shares  may  measure  competition  from  intemational  trade  less  precisely  than  indicators
based  on trade policies.  However, even though the traded-goods  sectors  in Taiwan (China)  and
Korea benefited from government  protection,  the protection was linked to a systematic structure
of incentives  to compete.'1 Furthermore,  the empirical  strategy tests the idea that international
trade  is acting  as  an  agent  for  increased  industry  competitiveness  in  the absence  of domestic
pressure.  The use of trade shares is appropriate for such a test.
IV.  Estimation Results
Equation  (1)  can be  estimated  with  alternative  methods  that  vary  in  treatment  of the
underlying  dynamics  over  time.  One  approach,  as  employed  in  Black  and  Brainerd  (2002),
applies Ordinary Least Squares to a cross-section of long-differenced  data.  Using this approach,
the  coefficient  on the  interaction  term in  Equation  (1)  measures  the impact  of the  change  in
international  competitiveness  on  the change  in the gender  wage  gap  in concentrated  industries
over a specified time period. To ensure robust standard errors in the event that the variance of the
error  term  is  not constant  across  industries,  we  weight  regressions  using  probability  weights
based on average-period  employment  levels by industry.  Table 2 presents  the  OLS results  for
13Taiwan (China) and Korea. Results  are reported as male-female  residual wage gaps measured in
log points x 100.  The columns vary as follows:  column 1 specifies  domestic concentration  as a
binary  variable  based  on  Pareto-function  estimates,  column  2  as  a  binary  variable  based  on
enterprises/output,  column  3 as  a continuous  variable  based on  Pareto-function  estimates,  and
column 4 as a continuous variable based on enterprises/output.
The  OLS  results  for  Taiwan  (China)  tell  a  compelling  story:  increased  openness  to
imports  over  time  in concentrated  industries  is  positively  and  significantly  associated  with  a
larger  residual wage gap,  and, by implication,  increased discrimination  against  female  workers.
This result  holds  across  the table's  alternative  measures  of industry  concentration,  and it  also
holds  when  assets-based  Pareto-function  estimates  are  used  to  measure  concentration  (not
reported).  In addition,  to avoid possible  distortions from the East Asian  financial crisis, further
robustness  tests  are conducted  for periods ending in  1996 and  1997.  The positive coefficient on
the interaction  term between concentration  and imports maintains  its positive sign and precision
in these tests, implying that the main result is not sensitive to effects  from the financial  crisis.'8
In Taiwan (China),  industry  competitiveness associated with imports appears  to have a stronger
impact on the residual gap than competitiveness  associated with exports. While the coefficient on
the interaction term between concentration and exports  is also positive, it is weakly significant in
just one of the specifications reported in Table 2 and insignificant in most other robustness tests.
OLS  results  for  Korea  indicate  that  higher export  ratios  in  concentrated  industries  are
positively  associated with the residual  gender wage gap.  However,  the  positive  coefficient  on
the  interaction term  with  exports  is precisely  estimated  for just two  of the four  concentration
specifications.  Further robustness tests that control  for spillover  effects  from the financial crisis
by ending  the  sample  in  1996  also  yield  a  positive  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  with
14exports, but it is  statistically  significant in only one  of the four  specifications.1 9 Although  the
precision  of the  Korean  results is not as  high  as  it is  for Taiwan  (China),  the Korean results
similarly do not support the dynamic implications of Becker's theory of discrimination.
While  the  simplicity  of  applying  Ordinary  Least  Squares  to  cross-section  data  is
appealing,  its restriction to data that is long-differenced  between an end year and beginning year
may be inadequate  in capturing the full impact of trade openness.  In the East Asian economies,
production of most  industrial sectors  is either imported or exported  to a large degree,  reflecting
the highly open nature of these economies.  Yet in the long-differenced  formulation,  trade would
have just as much an impact on an industry that rose  from 2% to 4%  as one  that rose from 92%
to 94%, and a sector would be considered as becoming less open if its trade ratio dropped from
94%  to  92%.  This observation  implies  that a panel  data  set of industry-level  observations  over
time,  rather than  a cross-section of long-differenced  observations, may better  capture the degree
of industry-level  competition  associated  with trade  openness.  A panel  data  set can provide  a
richer  source of information  about movements  in wage  gaps and  allow  for more  flexibility  in
estimating  the  effects  of trade  openness  across  industries.  Panel data  are  less  sensitive  to the
choice of beginning  and end years, and the  use of annual data series  across  industries allows  for
more degrees of freedom  than the use of a single cross-section.20 This feature is advantageous  for
the East Asian sample because of the relatively small number of industry categories.
Because  the  industry-level  gender wage  gaps  are  averages  of wages  that were  sampled
from  a  larger  population,  it  is  likely  that  the  industry-specific  constant  terms  are  randomly
distributed  across  industries  (Greene  1997).  To  handle  this issue,  a  Generalized  Least  Squares
estimation  procedure  that  corrects  for  random  effects  is  applied  to  the  panel  data  set.  The
random-effects  estimator is a matrix-weighted  average of estimates produced by the fixed-effects
15estimator (which uses OLS  for a regression  that differences  out fixed effects  within industries),
and  the  between  estimator  (which  uses  OLS  for  a  regression  that  averages  each  industry's
observations  over time).  Compared  to  the  OLS  application  to  long-differenced  data,  the  GLS
application to panel data retains more information  on wage gaps and trade ratios over time.
Table  3, which  has  the  same  organizational  set-up  as  the  preceding  table,  presents  the
GLS results.  The overall conclusions  are similar to those made for the OLS results.  For Taiwan
(China),  trade  competition  from  imports  is  positively  and  significantly  associated  with  wider
residual  wage gaps between men and women, no matter how domestic  concentration is defined.
Results  are  also  robust to  shortening  the  sample  period  to eliminate  potential  spillover  effects
from  the  financial  crisis.  For  Korea,  the  positive  relationship  between  trade  openness  in
concentrated  industries  and the residual  wage  gap  continues  to be evident  for exports,  but only
one out of four of the  coefficients  on the interaction term  is precisely estimated.  Finally,  serial
correlation  over time in  the panel  data series  may bias  the results.  A  final  set of specification
tests  is  based  on  GLS  regressions  that correct  for  random  effects  and  for  autocorrelation  of
degree one.  Results (not reported)  indicate that the coefficient  on the interaction  term between
concentration  and  imports  maintains  its  positive  sign  and  precision  for  Taiwan  (China).  For
Korea,  the  interaction  term  with exports  maintains  its  positive  sign  across  specifications  but is
not statistically significant.
V.  Conclusion
Intemational trade acts as an agent for industry competitiveness,  with direct repercussions
for  how  female  and  male  employees  are  treated  in  the  labor  market.  Two  longstanding
theoretical  approaches  to  labor  market  discrimination  generate  opposing  predictions  on  the
impact of international  trade on wage discrimination  against female workers.  If discrimination  is
16costly,  as  posited  in  neoclassical  theory  based  on  Becker  (1959),  then  increased  industry
competitiveness  from  intemational  trade  reduces  the  incentive  for  employers  to  discriminate
against women.  Competitive forces  from international trade should then eliminate discriminatory
pay differentials  in the long run.  In contrast, the non-neoclassical  approach views discrimination
as  entirely  consistent  with industry  competitiveness,  particularly  if women  are  segregated  into
low-paying jobs and face other impediments  to their bargaining positions in pay negotiations.
The study has explicitly tested Becker's theory  that discrimination  is incompatible  with
rising competitiveness.  The approach centers  on comparing  the impact of intemational trade on
wage  discrimination  in concentrated  and  non-concentrated  sectors.  The  effect of international
trade  competition  is expected to be more pronounced  in concentrated  sectors,  where  employers
can  use  excess  profits  in  the  absence  of trade  to  cover  the  costs  of discrimination.  Wage
discrimination  is proxied by the portion of the wage  gap that cannot be  explained by observable
skill differences  between men and women. The empirical model is  estimated using a rich panel
data set of residual wage gaps,  trade ratios,  and alternative  measures  of domestic  concentration
for two highly open East Asian economies during the 1980s and 1990s.
Results  indicate  that  in contrast to  the implications  of neoclassical  theory,  competition
from foreign trade  in concentrated  industries  is positively  associated  with  wage  discrimination
against female workers.  In Taiwan  (China),  greater trade openness  in concentrated  industries is
associated with wider residual wage  gaps between men and women, particularly when openness
is measured by the manufacturing-sector  import  ratio.  Import competition  appears to  widen the
wage  gap by adversely affecting  women's  relative  employment  prospects,  leading to  a  loss of
bargaining  power  for  women.  Women  thus  appear  to  be  bearing  the  brunt  of employers'
competitive cost-cutting efforts.  This finding lends support to the non-neoclassical  approach that
17wage  and  employment  discrimination  are  consistent  with  rising  industry  competitiveness.  In
Korea,  a  slight  reduction  in  export  openness  appears  to  be  associated  with  less  wage
discrimination  by  gender  in  concentrated  industries.  Results  for both  economies  imply  that
concerted  efforts  to  enforce  equal  pay  legislation  and  apply  effective  equal.  opportunity
legislation  are  crucial  for  ensuring  that  women's  pay  gains  will  match  those  of  men  in  a
competitive environment.
18Data Appendix
The  study  categorizes  manufacturing  industries  by  two-digit  codes  for Taiwan  (China)
and three-digit codes  for Korea since the labor data record industry at that level. Both the Taiwan
(China) and Korea  industry  classification  systems  are based on international  standards.  Taiwan
(China)'s  system  has undergone  six revisions  since its  inception in  1967.  The first year of data
used  in  this study is based  on  the second  revision.  Revisions  3 (1983),  4  (1987),  and 6 (1996)
contain  changes  primarily  at  the three-digit  level,  which  are  readily  reconcilable  with  earlier
versions  for  the two-digit  classifications.  Only  the  fifth  revision,  published  in  1991,  contains
major  changes  at  all  levels,  but  this revision  only  affects  the  labor data  from  1993  onwards.
Korea's classification  system has undergone  seven revisions  since its establishment in  1963.  The
first year of data  used  in  this  study is  based  on the  fourth  revision.  Revisions  5 (1984)  and 7
(1998)  contain  changes  primarily  at  the  four-digit  and  five-digit  levels,  which  are  readily
reconcilable  with  earlier  versions  for  three-digit  classifications  (Kang,  2001).  Only  the  sixth
revision, published in  1991, contains  major  changes  at all levels, but this  change only affects  the
labor  data  from  1993  onward.  As  reported  in  Appendix  Table  1, a  series  of matching  and
aggregation  steps were  conducted  to provide consistency  over time and to avoid  small  cell sizes
in the calculation  of average wages  by gender and  industry.2'
Appendix  Table  2 summarizes  the variables  and their sources.  The labor data for Taiwan
(China) come from the Manpower  Utilization  Survey for the period  1981-1999.  This household-
level survey contains  detailed  information on earnings,  employment,  and worker characteristics.
The  Korean  labor data come  from the Occupational  Wage Survey.  Due to  constraints on data
availability,  the sample  is limited to the years  1980,  1983,  1986,  1989,  1992,  1994,  1996,  and
1998. This establishment-level  survey also contains  comprehensive  labor-market information  for
19individual  workers.  Surveyed  establishments  are  selected  using  a  stratified  random  sampling
method  from  establishments  with  at least  10  workers.  The  samples  for both economies  cover
non-farm, civilian, paid employees; wages are deflated using the consumer price index.
The US-dollar value  of exports and  imports by 4-digit International  Standard  Industrial
Category  (ISIC)  are  from  the  International  Economic  Data Bank  (IEDB)  for the  period  1980-
1999  for  both  Taiwan  (China)  and  Korea.  IEDB  converts  UN  trade  data  from  Standard
International  Trade Categories to  ISIC using concordance  tables based on the structure of trade
and  production  in  the  two  economies.  The  trade  ratios  are  relative  to  a  measure  of  gross
production by industry.  For Taiwan  (China),  the data are gross receipts by 2-digit level Taiwan
(China) industry codes (revision  6) in new Taiwan dollars.  The production  data are converted  to
US dollars using the annual average  exchange rate.  The trade data are regrouped according to 2-
digit  Taiwan (China)  industry codes  (revision 6)  using a linking  scheme  based on concordance
tables published by the  United Nations  and the government  of Taiwan  (China).  For Korea,  the
production data are gross output in US dollars by 3-digit ISIC codes from the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database.
For Taiwan  (China),  the  data  for estimating  domestic  competitiveness  come  from  the
Industrial  and Commercial  Census.  This census, conducted once every five years, contains  data
by disaggregated  industry  on the number of enterprises  in various  operating-receipts  categories
of increasing size and in various  asset-size categories. For Korea,  domestic-competitiveness  data
come  from the Korean Industrial Census.  This census, conducted once every five  years, contains
data  by  disaggregated  industry  on  the  number  of establishments  in  various  shipment-value
categories of increasing  size and in various asset-size categories  (as indicated by paid-in-capital).
20In both economies, the alternative series  are used in different estimates  of domestic concentration
for a base year and an end year to check for robustness.
21Appendix  Table 1: Consistent Manufacturing Aggregates  by Standard Industrial Classification  Codes, Taiwan (China) and Korea.
Rev. 2-4  Rev. 5-6  Rev.  4-5  Rev.  6-7
Taiwan (China) Manufacturing  Industry  Aggregates  (1981-92)  (1993-99)  Korean Manufacturing  Industry  Aggregates  (1980-92)  (1993-98)
1  . Food, Beverage,  and Tobacco Manufactures  20, 21  11,  12  1  . Food Manufactures  311  151-154
2.  Textile  Industries; Manufacture  of Wearing  2.  Beverage and Tobacco Manufactures  313, 314  155,  160
Apparel and Accessories  22, 23  13,  14  3.  Textile Industries.  321  171-173
3.  Manufacture of Leather, Fur, and Related Products  24  15  4.  Manufacture  of Wearing Apparel  322  181
4.  Manufacture  of Wood Products, Bamboo Products,  5.  Manufacture  of Leather, Fur, Related Products,
and Furniture  25  16,17  and Footwear (except Rubber or Plastic Footwear)  323, 324  182, 191,  192
5.  Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products; Printing  26  18,  19  6.  Manufacture of Wood Products and Cork Products  331  201,  202
6.  Manufacture of Chemical Materials;  Manufacture  7.  Manufacture of Furniture  and Fixtures  332  361
of  Petroleum and Coal Products  27, 29  21, 23  8.  Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products  341  210
7.  Manufacture of Chemical Products  28  22  9.  Printing and Publishing  342  221, 222
8.  Manufacture of Rubber Products  30  24  10. Manufacture of Chemical Materials  351  241
9.  Manufacture  of Plastic Products  31  25  11. Manufacture of Chemical  Products  352  242, 243
10. Manufacture  of Non-metallic Mineral Products  32  26  12. Manufacture  of Petroleum and Coal Products  353, 354  231-233
11. Basic Metal Industries; Manufacture of Fabricated  13. Manufacture of Rubber Products  355  251
Metal Products  33, 34  27, 28  14. Manufacture of Plastic Products  356  252
12. Manufacture  and Repair of Machinery and  15. Manufacture of Pottery, China,  and Glass Products  361,  362  261
Equipment  35  29  16. Manufacture  of Other Non-metallic
13. Manufacture and Repair of Electrical and  Mineral Products  369  269
Electronic  Machinery and Equipment  36  31  17. Iron and Steel Basic Industries; Non-Ferrous
14. Manufacture  and Repair of Transport Equipment  37  32  Metal Basic Industries  371,  372  271-273
15. Manufacture of Precision  Instruments  38  33  18. Manufacture  of Fabricated Metal Products  381  281, 289
16. Manufacture of Miscellaneous  Industrial  19. Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment  382  291-293
Products  39  39  20. Manufacture of Electrical and Electronic
Machinery and Equipment  383  300,311-315,
319, 321-323
21. Manufacture of Transport Equipment  384  341-343,
351-353,  359
2. Manufacture of Precision  Instruments  385  331-333
23. Manufacture  of Miscellaneous Industrial Products  390  369, 371,  372
Sources:  DGBAS (1987, 1991)  and NSO (2001).
22Appendix Table 2: Variable Definitions  and Data Sources.
Variable  Description  Date Source: Taiwan (China)  Date Source: Korea
Real Wage:
Nominal Wage  Average wages and average  Manpower Utilization Survey,  Occupational Wage Survey,
residual wages by sex and industry  DGBAS  Ministry of Labor
1981-1999  1980, 83,  86, 89, 92, 94, 96, 98
Wage Deflator  Consumer price index  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,  NSO Online Statistical Database,
DGBAS (various)  NSO
1981-1999  1980-1998
Trade Shares:
Imports  CIF value by industry  International Economic Data Bank,  International Economic Data Bank,
ANU (2001)  ANU (2001)
1981-1999  1980-1998
Exports  FOB value by industry  International Economic Data Bank,  International Economic Data Bank,
ANU (2001)  ANU (2001)
1981-1999  1980-1998
Domestic Production  Gross receipts (Taiwan, China),  National Income Accounts,  Industrial Statistics Database,
gross output (Korea) by industry  DGBAS  UNIDO (2000)
1981-1999  1980-1998
Exchange Rate  Average exchange  rate  Financial Statistics (IMF),  Not applicable
Central Bank of China (various)
1981-1999
Industry Concentration:  Pareto-function estimates by  Industrial and Commercial Census,  Korean Industrial Census,
industry  DGBAS  NSO
1981,  1996  1983,  1998
23Table 1: Pareto-Function Estimates of Domestic  Competitiveness  for Taiwan (China) and Korea.
(Industry ranking in descending  order of competitiveness)
Taiwan (China)  1981  Korea  1983
Non-Concentrated  Non-Concentrated
1.  Basic Metal Industries; Fabricated Metal Products  -0.77  1.  Furniture and Fixtures  -0.75
2. Wood Products, Bamboo Products, and Furniture  -0.76  2. Miscellaneous  Industrial Products  -0.73
3. Machinery  and Equipment  -0.76  3. Wood Products and Cork Products  -0.73
4. Paper and Paper Products; Printing  -0.71  4. Printing and Publishing  -0.71
5. Miscellaneous  Industrial Products  -0.71  5.  Wearing Apparel  -0.66
6. Plastic Products  -0.67  6.  Fabricated Metal Products  -0.65
Concentrated  7. Plastic Products  -0.61
7. Food, Beverage,  and Tobacco Manufactures  -0.62  8.  Machinery  and Equipment  -0.58
8. Textile  Industries; Wearing Apparel &Accessories  -0.61  9. Other Non-metallic Mineral Products  -0.57
9. Non-metallic  Mineral Products  -0.61  10. Precision  Instruments  -0.57
10. Chemical Products  -0.58  11. Leather,  Fur, Related Products, and Footwear  -0.54
11.  Leather, Fur, and Related Products  -0.56  12. Textile Industries  -0.54
12.  Transport Equipment  -0.53  13.  Pottery, China, and Glass Products  -0.53
13.  Rubber Products  -0.52  Concentrated
14. Electrical, Electronic Machinery & Equipment  -0.51  14. Food Manufactures  -0.47
15.  Precision Instruments  -0.51  15. Beverage  and Tobacco Manufactures  -0.45
16. Chemical Materials, Petroleum,  and Coal Products  -0.26  16. Paper and Paper Products  -0.44
17. Transport Equipment  -0.40
18. Electrical, Electronic Machinery & Equipment  -0.37
19. Rubber Products  -0.35
20. Chemical Products  -0.24
21. Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metal Industries  -0.23
22. Chemical Materials  -0.22
23. Petroleum and Coal Products  -0.04
Note:  Figures report  the coefficient  estimates of Pareto  functions using  data  on number  of enterprises  by size  categories  of operating  receipts
(Taiwan, China) or shipments (Korea).
24Table 2: OLS Results for Residual Wage Gap Using Cross-Sectional, Long-Differenced  Data.
(in log pointsx O00; standard errors  in parentheses)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Panel A:  Taiwan  (China)
C  -6.86*  -5.42'  -20.28'  -64.77
(3.00)  (2.79)  (8.08)  (37.60)
i,M,  -1.17  -0.09  37.28"  11.75"
(1.86)  (2.03)  (13.10)  (3.90)
Cxz,M,  11.07  9.41  49.85*  131.35
(3.72)  (3.68)  (17.86)  (43.59)
constant  8.39  7.57  -8.31  1.23
(1.72)  (1.87)  (5.91)  (2.48)
C  -2.01  -1.76  -20.44  -36.59
(3.71)  (3.38)  (15.11)  (65.98)
A,X,  -5.73  -6.64  14.73  3.17
(3.73)  (3.80)  (9.38)  (5.27)
Cx.4X,  8.64  11.77  25.90  78.42
(6.04)  (5.91)  (15.01)  (55.95)
constant  9.25  9.08.  -4.85  6.37
(2.53)  (2.08)  (9.26)  (3.88)
Panel B:  Korea
C  -10.66  -4.15  -10.99  -4.87
(5.38)  (6.47)  (18.38)  (4.63)
4,M,  1.86  1.26  5.82  2.44
(2.80)  (2.26)  (9.60)  (4.07)
CxA1M 1 -1.36  3.03  6.36  0.50
(3.80)  (4.18)  (15.94)  (2.78)
constant  -1.40  -3.93  -11.71  -10.52
(4.57)  (4.87)  (9.28)  (5.29)
C  -15.96.  -9.41  -37.39  -9.35
(4.93)  (6.16)  (22.41)  (4.32)
4,A  1.21  -5.05  14.06**'  9.50*
(5.25)  (5.80)  (3.60)  (3.40)
CXIdXz  7.05  15.09'*  21.46*  6.30
(6.34)  (6.41)  (10.45)  (4.97)
constant  -0.78  -4.52  -26.87*  -16.63*
(3.88)  (4.84)  (11.45)  (4.55)
Note: Columns differ as follows:  (1)  C = Pareto-function  estimates, dummy;  (2)  C = #enterprises/output,
dummy;  (3) C  = Pareto-function  estimates,  continuous;  and  (4)  C  =  #enterprises,  continuous.  Pareto
functions are  estimated with receipts  data for Taiwan (China) and shipments data for Korea.  The notation
indicates  statistically  significant  at the  .01  level;  at  the  .05  level;  at the  .10  level.  There  are  16
observations  for  Taiwan  (China)  and  23  observations  for  Korea;  regressions  are  weighted  using
probability weights based on average-period  employment levels by industry.  The R2 statistics range from
0.07 to 0.38 for Taiwan (China) and from 0.07 to 0.34 for Korea.
25Table 3: GLS Results for Residual Wage Gap Using  Panel Data; Random Effects.
(in  log pointsxl 00; standard errors in parentheses)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Panel A:  Taiwan (China)
C  3.30  3.87  8.08  60.95
(3.07)  (3.03)  (10.60)  (41.87)
Ml  -0.05  0.22  19.02  6.65 
(1.05)  (1.00)  (4.26)  (1.37)
CxM,  5.07  5.30*  26.49  77.45
(1.40)  (1.40)  (6.70)  (23.73)
constant  37.44  37.07  43.85  42.69"
(2.39)  (2.21)  (6.61)  (2.70)
C  -3.41  -1.30  -12.47  -10.46
(3.17)  (3.12)  (12.26)  (42.31)
XI  0.41  -0.01  4.95  2.63
(1.70)  (1.38)  (4.47)  (1.81)
CxX,  1.01  3.12  6.63  29.66
(2.12)  (2.03)  (7.17)  (28.59)
constant  37.88  36.69  28.15  35.58*
(2.42)  (2.27)  (7.76)  (2.81)
Panel B:  Korea
C  0.05  0.21  6.65  -1.15
(3.45)  (3.42)  (10.97)  (2.97)
Ml  0.03  -0.13  1.62  -0.91
(0.95)  (0.95)  (2.98)  (1.49)
CxMl  0.19  0.58  2.89  -0.93
(1.56)  (1.54)  (5.36)  (1.27)
constant  27.09  27.08  30.46  25.90*
(2.22)  (2.23)  (5.81)  (3.25)
C  1.13  0.36  12.88  2.64
(3.07)  (3.02)  (8.30)  (2.50)
XI  -0.20  -0.21  3.08*  1.07
(1.07)  (1.09)  (1.76)  (1.14)
CxX:  0.75  0.69  5.99'  0.92
(1.40)  (1.40)  (3.50)  (1.08)
constant  26.73  27.00  33.61  29.85
(2.00)  (2.11)  (4.35)  (2.79)
Note:  Columns differ as follows:  (1) C = Pareto-function estimates, dummy;  (2) C = #enterprises/output,
dummy;  (3)  C  = Pareto-function  estimates,  continuous;  and  (4)  C  =  #enterprises,  continuous.  Pareto
functions are estimated with receipts data for Taiwan (China) and shipments  data for Korea.  The notation
indicates statistically  significant  at the  .01  level;  at the  .05 level;  at  the  .10 level.  There  are  304
observations  for Taiwan  (China) and  184 observations for Korea.  The Wald X2 statistics ranges from 3.1
to 38.4 for Taiwan (China) and from 0.1  to 3.2 for Korea.
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28Figure 3:  Female Share of Industry Employment,  Taiwan (China) and Korea
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29Figure 4:  Residual Wage Gaps and Trade Ratios by Industry, Taiwan (China) and Korea
Taiwan (China)  . Korea
Panel  A:  Electrical  Goods-Electronics  Industry  Panel C:  Electrical  Goods-Electronics  Industry
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34Endnotes
For example,  international  trade  is associated with rising wage inequality  or negative  overall
wage effects  in Chile (Beyer,  Rojas,  and Vergara  1999),  Mexico (Hanson  and  Harrison  1999;
Revenga  1997), and in the public sector in Morocco (Currie and Harrison  1997).  There is almost
no  wage  effect  for  Uruguay  (Rama  1994),  while  trade  is  associated  with  narrowing  wage
dispersion in East Asia (Wood 1997).
2 One exception  is Feliciano (2001), a study based on Mexican household survey data that finds a
significant increase in overall wage dispersion as a result of trade reforms.
3  For more discussion  of this alternative  approach to competition, see Darity (1989), Darity and
Williams (1985),  and Williams (1987).
4  This  approach  of  comparing  the  impact  of  foreign  trade  across  concentrated  and  less
concentrated  sectors was  developed  in Borijas and Ramey  (1995) in the  context of overall  U.S.
wage  inequality.  This study  finds that trade has a more adverse  effect on the skilled-unskilled
wage gap in concentrated industries.
5 For example, in  1983,  63% of Taiwan  (China)'s manufacturing  sector workers were employed
in  establishments  of  100  workers  or  less,  compared  with just  11%  of  workers  in  Korea's
manufacturing  sector in the same  year.  By 1998  these numbers  had changed little, with  66%  of
Taiwan (China)'s manufacturing workers in establishment sizes of up to  100 workers and  12% of
Korean workers.
6 The sharp rise in the  export ratios between  1996 and 1998  reflects the dramatic drop in output
due to the Asian crisis.
7In  Taiwan  (China),  in  1980  the  female  attainment  of high  school  or  above  (39%)  already
exceeded that of men  (36%);  these  shares  rose to  71% for women  and 66%  for men by  1999.
35Sample  means  also  indicate  a  decline  in  the  experience  and  tenure  gaps  between  men  and
women, and in industry segregation by gender.
8  A  male-female  wage  gap  may  be  converted  to  a  ratio  of  female  to  male  wages  by
exponentiating its negative.
9 The Korean data report textiles and apparel as two separate industries.
10  Equation (1)  is also estimated using average unadjusted wage  gaps by industry.  In most cases
results are similar, so for brevity, only the residual wage gap results are presented.
"  Regressions  for both Taiwan (China)  and Korea  include a dummy  for part-time worker  (less
than forty hours per week  for Taiwan (China)  or  160  hours per month  for Korea), dummies  for
education  level attained, years  of potential experience  (age,  minus  education, minus six) and  its
square, years of establishment-specific  tenure and its square, and dummies  for regional locations.
In  addition,  regressions  for  Taiwan  (China)  include  dummies  for  major  area  of study  and  a
dummy for urban  status.
12  The implicit assumption  is that male coefficients  more accurately  reflect competitive  returns
-to  observable  characteristics  than  female  coefficients.  An  alternative  approach  combines
coefficient  estimates for both men and women following Oaxaca  (1973).  These two approaches
yield the same measures for the total, predicted,  and residual earnings  gaps.
13  The data source  presents size categories as ranges.  In the estimations,  size  levels are chosen
to be the mid-point for each range.  Because the final range has no upper bound, the size level is
top coded as 1.2 times the lower bound.
14  Further  tests show  that the  operating receipts-based  rankings  are  highly correlated  with  the
assets-based rankings, with a Spearman coefficient of 0.95 in  1981 and also 0.95 in 1996.
3615  Despite  their  different  natures  in  industrial  structure,  Taiwan  (China)  and  Korea  have
considerable  overlap  in  the  concentration  rankings.  Some  exceptions  emerge  due to  the  more
detailed nature of the Korean sector classification.
16  Korean  data  for  shipments-based  Pareto  estimates  in  the  end year  (1998)  are  unavailable.
Further robustness tests using K-firm  concentration ratios,  the Herfindahl  index, and profit rates
are not possible for Korea due to data unavailability.
17  See  Amsden  (2001)  and  Stiglitz  and  Yusuf  (2001)  for  discussions  of the  competitive
environment  within  the  export  and  import-competing  sectors.  Also,  data  constraints  for
measures  related  to  trade  policy  in  both  Taiwan  (China)  and  Korea  limit  our  options  for
measuring international  competitiveness.
18  Robustness tests are  conducted  for six measures of concentration  and three end  years, for a
total of 18  combinations.  The coefficient on CXAM,  is positive and statistically significant  in all
of these tests.  The coefficient on Cxa,x, is positive and significant in just 2 of the  18 tests; in all
other tests the coefficient is insignificant.
19  Robustness  tests  are  also conducted  with assets-based  Pareto-function  estimates  to  measure
concentration,  in which none of the interaction terms with trade ratios are precisely estimated.
20  For Taiwan  (China), there are  16  observations  (16 industries)  in the cross-section  data versus
304  observations  (16  industries  x  19  years)  in  the  panel  data.  For  Korea,  there  are  23
observations  in  the  cross-section  data versus  184  observations  (23  industries  x 8 years)  in  the
panel data.
21  The  minimum cell size for  a gender-industry  group in the  sample period was  13.  Larger  cell
sizes would entail a tradeoff with degrees of freedom in the model estimations.
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